Review of "The Myth of the Good War" by Macrae, Robert (Macrae, R) (author)
The Myth of the Good War by Jacques Pauwels examines why the US entered World War II and fought with 
the Allies. Pauwels argues that America’s role was determined by the interests of America’s major 
corporations. He discusses twentieth century American foreign policy and impacts of the rise and fall of the 
Soviet Union. 
Pauwels holds PhDs in history and political science. He cites several historians, many American, who 
concur with his findings. His book was a European best seller for four month. 
He explains that although Britain and the US opposed Nazi Germany because Germany suppressed 
freedoms, they hadn’t extended similar freedoms within their colonies. British India and the US-occupied 
Philippines were far from democratic. Equally undemocratic were US supported, post-war, dictatorships in 
Latin America and the brutal civilian and military dictatorships in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey, Iran, 
Taiwan, Indonesia, Argentina, and Chile. When Pearl Harbour was attacked, Hawaii was an American 
colony. Hawaiians hadn’t invited the Americans to occupy their islands. Pearl Harbour was a battle between 
two imperial powers over spoils. Hawaii, if asked, would have preferred independence. 
Pauwels debunks the myth that Hitler seized control of Germany without support. Beyond his horrific racist 
legacy, Hitler eliminated unions and terrorized workers. In contrast, subsidiaries of American corporations 
including Coca-Cola, General Motors’s Opel Division, Ford’s Fordwerke, IBM’s facility in Berlin, and 
Standard Oil’s partner IG Farben (the poison gas manufacturer), flourished under Nazism. Pauwels records 
that workers were driven harder and faster. They were forbidden not only to strike, but to change jobs, and 
their wages were set quite low. For example, Fordwerke, which had posted losses prior to Hitler, saw 
annual profits soar after his ascent to power. `Fordwerke cut labour costs from fifteen to eleven percent of 
operating expenses while rearming Germany. 
Pauwels explains how Hitler’s policy prohibiting repatriation of profits to foreign parent companies was 
easily circumvented. US corporations profited in Nazi Germany throughout the war, even after the US 
entered. More surprising, Pauwels explains how these corporations paid little in war reparation after fighting 
ended. 
Pauwels describes how the Soviet Union made the biggest contribution to the Allied victory over Nazi 
Germany. In June, 1941, after Hitler had squeezed the British off the continent, he invaded the Soviet 
Union. The US, still neutral, and Britain expected a quick Nazi victory to eliminate the red peril. Pauwels 
elaborates why the US and Britain saw communism as a greater threat than fascism. 
Allied aid to the Soviet did not become meaningful until 1942 after the Soviet had singlehandedly stopped 
the Wehrmacht and started their counter-offensive. Far from helping the Soviets, US corporations, Texaco 
and Standard Oil, shipped oil to fuel the Nazi offensive. In 1942, Stalin asked his Allies to open a second 
diversionary front in Europe. 
Pauwels hypothesizes, “Dieppe, the massacre of Canadians in an operation that violated all of the rules of 
military logic and strategy, silenced those who clamoured for a second front.” 
“Canadians,” says Pauwels, “constituted the perfect cannon fodder because their leaders did not belong to 
the British-American top command who would have been reluctant to sacrifice their own men.”  
To Stalin’s dismay, Britain and America invaded North Africa and Italy offering little support to the Soviet 
Union. The Soviet victory at Stalingrad followed by a rapid sweep across Europe forced the Normandy 
Invasion. Pauwels, argues the Cold war was a deliberate American construct to prevent Germany from 
paying reparations to the Soviet Union and to force the USSR to make unsustainable, defensive military 
expenditures. According to Pauwels, World War Two truly ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
